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TPM-Based Remote Attestation for Wireless Sensor Networks
Donglai Fu and Xinguang Peng
Abstract: It is essential to design a protocol to allow sensor nodes to attest to their trustworthiness for missioncritical applications based on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). However, it is a challenge to evaluate the
trustworthiness without appropriate hardware support. Hence, we present a hardware-based remote attestation
protocol to tackle the problem within WSNs. In our design, each sensor node is equipped with a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) which plays the role of a trusted anchor. We start with the formulation of remote attestation and its
security. The complete protocol for both single-hop and multi-hop attestations is then demonstrated. Results show
the new protocol is effective, efficient, and secure.
Key words: network security; wireless sensor networks; remote attestation; trusted platform module

1

Introduction

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been widely
applied in critical applications, such as natural
disaster detection[1] , traffic maintenance[2] , and
civil infrastructure surveillance[3] . In general, these
applications are deployed in unattended or even
antagonistic environments. Therefore, security is
a prominent issue for these WSNs[4, 5] . Although
reputation-based trust management frameworks[6] are
a feasible solution to the concern, this approach has
shortcomings. For instance, it is difficult to evaluate the
trustworthiness of strange nodes without historical data.
Consequently, remote attestation[7] is used to solve the
problem in the current study. Recently, this measure
has been employed to detect malicious nodes in the
field of WSNs[8–10] . Generally, these methods can be
divided into two categories[11, 12] , software-based and
hardware-based.
Software-based remote attestation is proposed to
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verify the integrity of a potentially compromised node
without using any hardware devices. The advantage of
the technique lies in low cost, because it does not need
special hardware, nor physical access to the device.
Therefore, the technology can be easily integrated into
old devices that are resource-constrained. As simple
as this may sound, it is very complicated to correctly
design such an attestation scheme in practice[13, 14] .
In contrast, hardware-based attestation utilizes
additional secure hardware to verify the integrity
of a suspicious node. Its merits rely on a special
device that provides strong assurance for delivered
evidences. Initially the technique was used in traditional
computing contexts that are insensitive to cost, but
the size, cost, and overhead have to be considered
by designers in resource-limited environments. In
recent years, researchers deemed that the mechanism
was unfeasible for resource-limited environments such
as WSNs. But recent developments in hardware
technology have made it feasible. Nowadays, the
AT97SC* series of devices have been offered with
three different interfaces, SPI, LPC, and I2C[15] .
Furthermore, all versions are supported in both
commercial and industrial grades. It is to be observed
that these chips implement version 1.2 of the Trusted
Computing Group specifications, and a 2048-bit RSA
signature can be processed in 200 ms.
The goal of this study is to design a new approach
to verify the integrity of remote nodes distributed in
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single-hop or multi-hop WSNs. The approach should
be effective, efficient, and secure. More to the point,
the paper presents a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)based Security Remote Attestation Protocol (TSRAP),
for WSNs. Each sensor node is equipped with one TPM
in the protocol. The protocol starts with a challenger
sending a challenge to a target. On receiving the
challenge, the target constructs a response with the aid
of the TPM, and sends it back to the challenger. Finally,
the challenger evaluates the trustworthiness of the target
according to the response. In the procedure, the TPM
ensures the authenticity of the response.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we survey related works in the area of remote
attestation. Section 3 describes our network model, and
then formulates a TPM-based remote attestation process
by a TPM-based Remote Attestation Protocol (TRAP),
and defines TSRAP. Assumptions, the threat model, and
attack types are presented at the end of the section. In
Section 4, the specific TSRAP named TSRAP-I and its
security proof are demonstrated. Section 5 analyzes the
ability to resist attacks. Performance evaluations are
exhibited in Section 6. We summarize the study at the
end of the paper.
Relative to the state of the art, the main contributions
of this paper are as follows:
(1) The definition of the TPM-based secure remote
attestation protocol provides essential prerequisites for
the design, usage, or study of such secure-remoteattestation protocols based on TPM.
(2) A new TPM-based secure remote attestation
protocol named TSRAP-I is introduced for WSNs.
We detailed TSRAP-I, and evaluated its security and
performance. Results show our protocol is effective,
efficient, and secure.

2
2.1

Related Work
Software-based remote attestation

SWATT[16] is an early software-based remote attestation
technique for embedded systems. It allows a trusted
external node to verify memory contents of an
embedded device without any secure hardware. But
the assumption of the clock speed is too rigorous for
designers. Shaneck et al.[17] later proposed a softwarebased remote attestation without requiring additional
hardware support for wireless sensor networks. Though
the approach is not dependent on the precise
measurement of execution timing, it still requires
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that the challenger receives the response within an
expected time. Furthermore, the protocol relies on
self-modifying code that is hard to implement, to
prevent attackers from tampering with attestation codes.
In Ref. [18], the authors introduced a distributed
software-based remote attestation protocol to detect
compromised nodes. In their scheme, free program
memory is filled with random data before deployment
to prevent attackers from acquiring enough space to
store and run malicious codes. The authors of Ref. [19]
presented a software-based attestation procedure that
employs a program counter that is not always available
to software. Despite the advantage of the cost, some
attacks were available to the methods in Refs. [13, 14].
Recently, researchers designed some purely softwarebased schemes[20–24] to allow a local node to attest to its
integrity to a external node. However, these methods do
not bind any hardware characteristics to the attestation
protocol, and are vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
2.2

Remote attestation based on a trusted platform
module

It is commonly agreed that software-based solutions
are more vulnerable to attacks than hardware-based
solutions, which have been considered unfeasible for
the resource-limited environment because of their size,
cost, and energy consumption in recent years. However,
we assert that the idea changed with the arrival of
the TPM (called AT97SC3203S[25] ) from the Atmel
Corporation.
TPM is a secure chip based on trusted computing
specifications[26] . It is a hardware cryptographic module
consisting of an execution engine, volatile memory, and
non-volatile storage. The engine is designed for SHA-1,
RSA key generation, encryption, signing, and random
number generation. The endorsement key, EK, and the
attestation identity key, AIK, are two important keys
for this secure chip. The EK is an asymmetric key
pair permanently bound to the platform, and is used
in a process for the issuance of AIK credentials and
to establish a platform owner. In the old version of
TCG specifications, it was generated by the vendor.
However, it derives from a common seed in the TPM 2.0
specifications. The AIK is also an asymmetric key pair,
and is generated and managed by the TPM with the aid
of a privacy certification authority, i.e., a CA. One TPM
can have many AIKs. Different AIKs are used to protect
privacy when the platform owner is concerned about the
consequences of collusion. In this study, we assume that
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each TPM owns an AIK, and the key does not change
during the attestation process—although the situation
may be different in practice. Such an assumption is not
critical, because the generation of the AIK is not our
main concern. In addition, we point out that the chip
has a set of special registers, Platform Configuration
Registers (PCRs). These PCRs can be classified into
two groups, static and dynamic, according to their
initial value and the time that they can be reset. Static
PCRs, PCR 0-16, are reset to 0 on system reboot.
Dynamic PCRs, PCR 17-23, are initialized as –1 and
0 at reboot and run-time, respectively. In addition,
both can only be updated through the extend function,
which aggregates the current content of a PCR with
new content, hashes them, and stores the result back
in the PCR. This promising technique can provide
two important services, namely, secure storage and
platform attestation. In recent years, we have carried
out some research[27–31] into platform attestation and its
application for a general computing environment with a
plenty of resources.
In the area of WSNs, these advantages of TPM
were considered for key establishment, distribution,
and management in Ref. [32]. Their work shows the
TPM can dramatically enhance WSNs’ security. In
Ref. [33], two TPM-based attestation protocols were
constructed to detect compromised nodes in WSNs. In
these two protocols, only cluster heads can attest to
their integrity to other cluster nodes because only these
sensor nodes are equipped with a TPM chip. Moreover,
the scheme relies on a trusted system state that never
changes. In Refs. [8, 15], authors proposed the first
platform with supporting RSA-based functions with the
help of the TPM chip. Their contributions show that
a trusted sensor node with low energy consumption,
low cost, and small size is available. Tan et al.[34]
implemented a remote attestation protocol to detect
unauthorized tampering with application codes by the
aid of the TPM chip. In the implementation, each
sensor node is equipped with a TPM chip. Wagner
et al.[35] presented a TPM-based code-update protocol
that enables one node with the TPM chip to prove
its trustworthiness to another node. In Ref. [36], the
authors reviewed various types of physical attacks on
WSNs and some trusted wireless sensor nodes. Their
contributions show that further research on TPM-based
attestation is essential to provide enough security for
more challenging applications of WSNs.
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3
3.1

Problem Statements
Network model

As shown in Fig. 1, WSNs consist of hundreds or
thousands of low-cost nodes that have a fixed location
or are randomly deployed to gather critical data. The
flow of data ends at a special node called a base
station or a sink. The sink is used to link one sensor
network to another network. In general, these sinks
have enough memory, storage, power, and bandwidth
to communicate with other sinks, but sensor nodes
communicate to the nearest sink in a multi-hop manner
because of their limited power, bandwidth, and radio
range. The owner of a WSN may set some special
nodes that collect readings from surrounding nodes, and
forward a single message called an aggregate value to
the next node, to save energy.
Sensor nodes are easily compromised by adversaries
because they are generally deployed in open and even
hostile environments. Therefore, the sensor node must
verify the integrity of cooperators before transactions.
Remote attestation is an alternative approach.
3.2

TSRAP

TPM-based remote attestation is a process by which a
platform can attest to its trustworthiness, i.e., integrity.
In the process, the appraiser is called a challenger, and
the attesting entity, the platform, is termed a target.
Furthermore, a TPM represents a trusted entity which
cannot be damaged by malicious software, and can
vouch for the accuracy of its messages. Thus, TPMbased attestation is a powerful tool for assessing the
trustworthiness of a target.
The attestation process is triggered by the challenger
according to TCG specifications. It first sends a

Base station
Sensor node
Aggregation node
High bandwidth
Low bandwidth

Fig. 1

Wireless sensor network architecture.
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challenge to the target. Upon receiving the challenge,
the target submits complete platform-configuration data
called “the response to the challenger”. Finally, the
challenger evaluates the trustworthiness of the target
by comparing the received Store Measurement Log
(SML) and PCR values with reference values.
The goal of the attestation is to allow a benign target
to generate an authentication token that convinces the
challenger that it is in an expected state. The key issue
is that the token must reflect the target’s real state. To
discuss the problem, we first define the attesting process
as a protocol noted as TRAP (see Definition 1), then
describe the definition of the TPM-based secure remote
attestation protocol, TSRAP, by a secure experiment.
Definition 1 TRAP The TPM-based remote
attestation protocol is a triple .Req, Res, Ver/ consisting
of polynomial-time algorithms:
(1) c
Req.n/
The challenge-generation algorithm Req takes as
input a random n, and outputs the challenge c. We
write this algorithm as c
Req.n/, since Req may
be randomized.
(2) r
Res.s; c/
The response-generation algorithm Res takes as input
the target’s state s and the challenge c, and outputs the
response r.
(3)  WD Ver.r/
The verification-algorithm Ver takes as input the
received response r; and outputs an authentication token
 2 f0; 1g.  D 1 iff the target’s state s corresponds to
the expected value; else  D 0: We write this algorithm
as  WD Ver.r/ since Ver is deterministic.
As shown in Definition 2, the experiment Exp
˘
is defined for any remote attestation protocol ˘ D
.Req; Res; Ver/ and any adversary .
Definition 2 Exp
The adversary  submits
˘
0
one state s ¤ s or one challenge c 0 ¤ c, and accesses
r
Res.s; c/. Eventually, it outputs a response r 0 .
The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r 0 D r,
and 0 otherwise. We write Exp
˘ D 1 if the output is 1,
and in this case we say that adversary  succeeds.
As shown in Definition 3, we define a secure remote
attestation protocol named TSRAP, based on Definition
2, to formulate the TPM-based secure remote attestation
process.
Definition 3 TSRAP We say a TRAP is secure
if there exists a negligible function negl for any
polynomial-time adversary  and a sufficiently large n
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such that PrŒExp
˘ .n/ D 1 6 negl.n/.
3.3

Assumptions

Though TSRAP is valid for general TPM-based remote
attestation scenarios, we are mainly concerned with
WSNs in this study. Therefore, we make the following
assumptions. Firstly, sensor nodes including sinks are
equipped with a TPM chip that cannot be compromised
by attackers. Furthermore, sinks can be broken by
aggressors, and they own unlimited resources, in
contrast to ordinary sensor nodes. Secondly, links are
insecure among sensor nodes because wireless links are
easily accessed by hackers. Finally, each TPM chip
has possessed an endorsement key and an attestation
identity key, as well as a sealing key.
3.4

Threat model and attack types

In this study, adversaries have the following abilities:
(1) Adversaries can eavesdrop on, copy, and replay
messages transmitted on channels. (2) Adversaries
can either intercept legal messages or inject forged
messages. (3) A small number of malicious sensor
nodes can be deployed with the same hardware
capabilities as benign sensor nodes. (4) Their physical
architecture cannot be modified. Moreover, attackers
cannot control a large number of sensor nodes because
this requires them to be physically present in the
deployment region with hardware for a long time.
However, to install malicious codes to sensor nodes
is possible over the air. (5) Cryptography primitives
cannot be broken. In other words, thieves cannot
retrieve messages without knowing keys.
As before, the function r
Res.s; c/ must be such
that (1) only the function can compute a valid response
r; (2) r must accurately capture the target’s state s. That
is to say, Res.s 0 ; c 0 / D Res.s; c/ is negligible for any
s 0 ¤ s or c 0 ¤ c. Two types of attack may be launched
by adversaries based on the above description. One
is that adversaries simulate Res.s; c/, and correctly
compute its output r. Another is that r cannot correctly
reflect .s; c/. Stated briefly, adversaries escape the
detection of TSRAP.

4
4.1

TSRAP-I
Notations

Before describing the specific TSRAP called TSRAPI, notations used in the rest of the paper are illustrated
below.
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Bi : i -th base station;
Ni : i -th sensor node;
KNi Bi : session key between Ni and Bi ;
pk
.AIKi ; AIKsk
i /: attestation identity key pairs of TPM
of the sensor node Ni ;
pk
.Si ; Sisk /: sealing key pairs of the sensor node Ni
for sealing sensitive data;
Cb : content of the bootloader program;
Cp : content of the application program;
Vp : referenced hash value of the application;
k: concatenation operation;
PCRi : i-th PCR;
HMAC: hashed message authentication
code function;
h: SHA-1 hash function.
4.2

Description of TSRAP-I

TSRAP-I encompasses three phases: an initial phase, a
bootloader phase, and an attestation phase.
Initial phase: This phase is invoked before
deployment. Therefore, we suppose that sensor nodes
are correct in this phase. A node Ni executes the
following operations.
(1) Ni sends the command TPM Loadkey to the TPM
pk
to load the sealing key .Si ; Sisk /.
(2) Ni sends the command TPM SHA1Start and
TPM SHA1Complete to the TPM to compute the hash
of Cb , noted as hb .
(3) Ni sends the command TPM Extend to the TPM
to extend hb to PCR1 .
(4) Ni sends the command TPM Seal to the TPM to
seal KNi Bi and PCR1 together.
Bootloader phase: This phase occurs before
listening to the code-update request and after the
initialization of the bootloader. Steps (2) and (3) that
ran in the initial phase must be executed again in the
bootloader phase, or KNi Bi cannot be unsealed. During
this phase, a node Ni completes the following tasks.
(1) Ni sends the command TPM SHA1Start and
TPM SHA1Complete to the TPM to compute the hash
of Cb , noted as hb .
(2) Ni sends the command TPM Extend to the TPM
to extend hb to PCR1 .
(3) Ni sends the command TPM SHA1Start and
TPM SHA1Complete to the TPM to compute the hash
of KNi Bi k Cp , noted as hp .
(4) Ni sends the command TPM Extend to the TPM
to extend hp to PCR2 .
Attestation phase: This phase occurs whenever
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the challenger N1 needs to evaluate the target N2 .
In the following processes, N1 confirms that N2 has
been compromised if the attestation token  D 0. The
interactions among participants can be seen in Fig. 2.
N1 performs the following steps to evaluate N2 .
(1) N1 sends the command TPM Unseal to its TPM
to unseal KN1 B1 ; if the operation fails, the attestation
process stops.
(2) N1 sends the command TPM GetRandom to its
TPM to get a random R1 .
(3) N1 sends fN1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; HMAC.KN1 B1 ; N1 ;
B1 ; N2 ; R1 /g to the base station B1 , and waits for its
response. If no response is received in time or the
response is incorrect, the session will be stopped.
After B1 receives the above message from N1 , B1
performs the following steps.
(1) Verify the integrity of the message and the
identity of the sender by computing HMAC.KN1 B1 ;
N1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 /. If the check is not passed, it will
inform N1 that the request is invalid, and stop the
session.
(2) B1 sends the message fB1 ; N2 ; R1 ; HMAC
.KN2 B1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 /g to N2 .
On receiving the above message from B1 , N2
performs the following steps.
(1) Verify the integrity of the message and
the identity of the sender by computing HMAC
.KN2 B1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 / again. If the check is not passed,
it will inform B1 that the request is invalid, and stop the
session.
(2) N2 sends the command TPM Unseal to its TPM
to unseal KN2 B1 . If the operation fails, it will inform
B1 that the response fails, and stop the session.
(3) N2 sends the command TPM Quote.R1 ;
PCR2 / to its TPM to get a random R2 and the
cryptographic reporting of PCR2 called Quote.

Fig. 2 Interaction diagram of challenger, target, and base
station.
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(4) N2 sends the message fN2 ; R1 ; R2 ; PCR2 ; Quote,
HMAC.KN2 B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ; PCR2 ; Quote/g to B1 .
(5) Remove KN2 B1 .
Upon receiving the above message from N2 , B1
performs the following steps.
(1) Verify the integrity of the message and the identity
of the sender by computing HMAC.KN2 B1 ; N2 ; R1 ;
R2 ; PCR2 ; Quote/.
pk
(2) Verify Quote using AIK2 .
If any check is not passed, it will inform N1 that the
response is invalid, and stop the session.
(3)  D 1 only if PCR2 D Quote D Vp , or  D 0.
(4) B1 sends the message fB1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ; ;
HMAC.KN1 B1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ;  /g to N1 .
On receiving the above message, N1 performs the
following steps.
(1) Verify the integrity of the message and the identity
of the sender by computing HMAC.KN1 B1 ; B1 ; N2 ;
R1 ; R2 ; /. If the check is not passed, N1 deems that the
response is invalid, and stops the session.
(2) It checks the attestation token  , and makes a
decision regarding the trustworthiness of N2 .
(3) Remove KN1 ;B1 .
4.3

Security proof

Theorem 1 TSRAP-I is a TPM-based secure remote
attestation protocol with respect to TSRAP.
Proof
As discussed before, if an adversary constructs a
response r 0 D r by taking as inputs s 0 ¤ s or c 0 ¤ c,
we say the adversary succeeds, or fails.
In the above construction, fN1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 ;
HMAC.KN1 B1 ; N1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 /g, .PCR2 ; Quote/,
and fN2 ; R1 ; R2 ; PCR2 ; Quote; HMAC.KN2 B1 ; N2 ; R1 ;
R2 ; PCR2 ; Quote/g correspond to c, s, and r,
respectively.
Now, we consider two cases.
(1) c 0 ¤ c. In fact, c 0 can only be a stale c since
the adversary cannot generate a fresh c without KN1 B1 .
Yet, it is difficult to extract it from a sensor node without
breaking its TPM. Thus, the response r 0 may be only an
old message, which will be detected by B1 . In other
words, r 0 ¤ r does not hold.
(2) s 0 ¤ s. In the case, although an attacker can
replace PCR2 with h.Cp0 /, Quote cannot be tampered
with. Therefore, the attacker cannot construct a fresh
s 0 D s. Thus, r 0 D r also does not hold.
As a consequence, TSRAP-I is secure with respect to
TSRAP.


5
5.1
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Security Discussion
Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use (TOCTTOU)
attacks

TOCTTOU is a popular attack against remote
attestation. The concrete process is as follows. The
attacker generates a correct attestation response from
correct codes when the time-of-check case happens,
but it invokes malicious codes when the time-of-use
case emerges. There are three kinds of scenarios to be
considered in the attack.
The first is that benign and malicious codes swap
places. On being attested, the former is used to generate
a valid response. When being executed, the latter is
invoked to do evil. In our scheme, evildoers have
two approaches to launch the attack. One is that they
generate a fresh PCR2 rather than read the value from
PCR registers. In this case, the generated response does
not contain a correct cryptographic reporting of PCR2
called Quote because the command TPM Quote only
receives the index of the PCR instead of its content.
Furthermore, its content is retrieved within the TPM.
Therefore, the case will be detected by the base station.
Another is that intruders inject malware over the air.
The malware may next attempt to write an expected
value. However, such an operation is doomed to failure
without knowing the session key KN1 B1 .
A second case is that correct codes are placed in
the correct location, but malicious codes are invoked
on being executed. In this case, attackers also have
two approaches to launch the attack. One is to
inject a jump instruction to malicious codes into the
correct application. Another is that attackers construct
malicious codes by invoking existing routines in a
different order[37] . It should be stressed that the attack
must exploit programs to process received broadcast
packets. Thus, the attack can be detected only by
integrating packet-processing codes into the application
software.
The last case is that both are not in the right location,
but malicious codes are executed, and correct codes are
attested. Obviously, this case is a combination of the
above two cases. Therefore, it can be resisted as long as
either of them can be found.
5.2

Rootkit-based attacks

Rootkit-based attacks are as follows. On receiving the
challenge, the program-memory hook first copies itself
to the free data memory, then makes the return address
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of the attestation process point to the data-memory
hook, and moves malicious codes from the program
memory to the data memory. After the attestation
is completed, the data-memory hook restores the
program-memory hook again.
In our scheme, the above attack can not be mounted.
There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, if the
removal occurs in the attestation stage, the installation
of the new application will result in the execution of the
bootloader. As a result, PCR2 is rewritten. On the other
hand, if the removal happens in the bootloader stage,
the bootloader’s codes need to be modified. However,
this will lead to KNi Bi not being able to be unsealed.
Therefore, adversaries are also doomed to failure in this
case.
5.3

MITM attacks

Attacks against communication protocols need to be
considered in our scheme since we assume that
adversaries have complete power over communication
channels. Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) is a popular
attack against communication protocols. There are three
cases to be considered in TSRAP-I.
The first is that the attacker impersonates a
middleman between the challenger and the base
station. The second is that the attacker plays the role
of the middleman between the target and the base
station. The third approach is one in which it simulates
a base station between the challenger and the target.
In the first case, messages on the channel include
fN1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; HMAC.KN1 B1 ; N1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 /g
and fB1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ; ; HMAC.KN1 B1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 ;
R2 ; /g. In the second case, messages are fB1 ; N2 ; R1 ;
HMAC.KN2 B1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 /g and fN2 ; R1 ; R2 ; PCR2 ;
Quote, HMAC.KN2 B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ; PCR2 ; Quote/g.
In the last case, the channel includes all the
aforementioned messages.
Clearly, this attack cannot be mounted. There are
three reasons for this. The first is that the attacker
cannot tamper with messages because the hashed
message-authentication code is always included in
each message. The second is that it cannot replay
outdated messages because of the appearance of
random numbers. Finally, it cannot construct legal
messages without knowing the shared key. Therefore,
the only thing the attacker as a middleman can do is to
steal sensitive information. Yet, in TSRAP-I, nothing
is kept secret, except for keys, which are not shown on
channels.
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6
6.1

Performance Evaluation
Storage requirements

Protocols should be kept to a low storage overhead
for WSNs because of their limited memory. In this
section, we do not analyze the storage overhead of the
base station since we assume that it has rich memory
resources. As shown in Table 1, sensor nodes must
store the storage root key, the attestation identity key,
the sealing key, and the session key. The first three keys
are 2048-bit RSA keys according to TCG specifications.
The last key is a 56-bit symmetric key. Therefore,
the storage requirements of the keys are 6200 bitsD
775 bytes. Though the overhead seems to be unsuitable
for a sensor node with a 4 KB EEPROM, in practice, the
TPM chip called AT97SC3203S[25] provides designers
with an internal EEPROM, which can store multiple
RSA keys. Furthermore, it can also generate 1024-bit
RSA keys. What’s more, the shared key is stored inside
the chip. Accordingly, existing products can satisfy
current storage requirements.
Besides the above keys, a sensor node should save
its identifier, the identifier of the base station, and
cooperators’ identifiers. Let LN denote the length of
the identifier, and a cooperator’s number is denoted
!. Thus, the storage requirements for identifiers are
LN  .! C 1/.
6.2

Energy consumption

In this section, we only discuss the challenger’s and
the target’s energy usage after deployment. For our
protocol, the energy usage is mainly attributed to three
cases: execution of TPM commands, transmission and
reception of messages, and HMAC operation. In the
protocol, TPM commands encompass TPM SHA1Start,
TPM SHA1Complete, TPM Extend, TPM Unseal,
TPM GetRandom, and TPM Quote. We denote their
energy by e t1 ; e t 2 ; e t 3 ; e t 4 ; e t 5 ; and e t 6 , respectively.
Let eHMAC denote the energy of the HMAC operation.
We use e1r and e1s to represent the energy usage for
sending and receiving one byte respectively. We write
Table 1

Storage requirements for keys.

Key

Number

Length (bit)

Storage root key
Identity key
Sealing Key
Shared key

1
1
1
1

2048
2048
2048
56

Total

4

6200
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the lengths of the identifier, the nonce, the PCR value,
the variable Quote, an HMAC, and authentication as
l1 ; l2 ; l3 ; l4 ; l5 ; and l6 , respectively.
As shown in Table 2, the energy usage of operations
is eco D 2  .e t1 C e t 2 C e t 3 / C e t 4 C e t 5 C 2  eHMAC
for the challenger. Moreover, the challenger sends the
message fN1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; HMAC.KN1 B1 ; N1 ; B1 ;
N2 ; R1 /g, and receives the message fB1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ; ;
HMAC.KN1 B1 ; B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ;  /g during the
attestation stage. Therefore, the energy usage is ecs D
e1s .3l1 Cl2 Cl5 / for sending, and the energy usage
of the reception is ecr D e1r  .2  l1 C 2  l2 C l5 C l6 /.
Thus, the total energy usage is ect D eco C ecs C ecr .
In contrast, the energy usage of operations is epo D
2  .e t1 C e t2 C e t 3 / C e t 4 C e t 6 C 2  eHMAC
for the target, according to Table 2. What’s more,
the target sends one message fN2 ; R1 ; R2 ; PCR2 ;
Quote; HMAC.KN2 B1 ; N2 ; R1 ; R2 ; PCR2 ; Quote/g, and
receives one message fB1 ; N2 ; R1 ; HMAC.KN2 B1 ;
B1 ; N2 ; R1 /g during the attestation stage. Therefore,
the energy usage is eps D e1s .l1 C2l2 Cl3 Cl4 Cl5 /
for sending one byte, and the energy usage for receiving
one byte is epr D e1r  .2  l1 C l2 C l5 /. Thus, the
total energy usage is ept D epo C eps C epr .
In Ref. [33], the authors demonstrated that the cost
of two operations, unsealing and signature, is high, but
other operations’ cost is negligible. In our protocol,
only the unsealing operation is used once for the
challenger. In contrast, the two operations are used once
for the target. Hence, the target’s cost is higher than the
challenger’s cost in energy usage. The cost is a whisker
away from 210 mJ, which is less than the energy usage
221 mJ present in Ref. [33].
6.3

Performance optimization

In the above protocol, the target carries extra poundage.
However, it is unnecessary to require the target to
generate a fresh response every time the challenge

happens. More to the point, it is to allow the base
station both to save the response to its cache and to
update it in regular intervals. There are three reasons for
this. The first is that the base station is creditable. The
second reason is that it owns rich resources. Finally,
the measure can accelerate the attestation process, and
reduce energy consumption. The effect will be more
prominent when multiple challenges simultaneously
happen to validate the integrity of the same remote
node.

7

Bootloader

Attestation

Operation
TPM SH1Start
TPM SHA1Complete
TPM Extend
TPM Unseal
TPM GetRandom
TPM Quote
HMAC

C
2
2
2
1
1
0
2

T
2
2
2
1
0
1
2

Conclusion

In this paper, we present a new TPM-based remote
attestation protocol named TSRAP-I for WSNs. Each
sensor node is equipped with a TPM chip which
acts as a trust anchor. We started with some formal
definitions for TPM-based secure remote attestation.
Afterwards, we elaborated on TSRAP-I. In the protocol,
the challenger evaluated the target’s trustworthiness
with the help of the trusted base station and the secure
chip called TPM. In theory, we confirmed that the
security of TSRAP-I conformed to the definition of
TSRAP. Finally, we discussed three kinds of attacks
against the new protocol. The storage cost and energy
consumption were also examined. We also proposed
optimization measures.
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